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Introduction 
Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia stand at a crucial crossroad in their political evolution as they face 
simultaneous challenges from domestic, regional, and global forces. Despite all surface 
appearances to the contrary, all three Maghrebi states are governed autocratically. As such, they 
will be unable to meet the upcoming threats to their political stability, social cohesion, cultural 
integrity, and economic viability. One result will be increased domestic, regional, and global 
tensions as militant forces seep through these sociopolitical fault lines finding support from and 
identification with similarly discontented co-religionists livi ng in Europe. Terrorism is the most 
extreme manifestation of this diffused discontent made “legitimate” through an Islamic idiom of 
martyrdom. 
The demands for political pluralism, democracy, and transparency continue to make themselves 
felt both within and outside society.[1] The Broader Middle East Initiative[2] is but one important 
and highly visible such effort originating from Washington but similar appeals derive from diverse 
sources including international human rights organizations, NGO’s, domestic political opponents 
both secular and Islamist, multilateral lending institutions, and regional groupings like the Arab 
League which has produced two scathing reports, co-published with the United Nations 
Development Program (UNPD), on the absence of political freedoms in all of the Arab world.[3] 
Economically and socially as well, the demands for visible improvements in living standards and 
the quality life cut across diverse social classes and occupational groupings. Despite repeated 
promises by ruling elites of significant improvements in macro- and micro-economic performance 
through accelerated structural adjustments, expanded privatization efforts, increased foreign 
direct investment, implementing transparency and the rule of law, rooting out corruption and 
nepotism, and creating an overall environment conducive to productive human effort, the full 
potential of all three Maghrebi economies remains unrealized. 
These combined failures in the political and socioeconomic spheres have impacted negatively on 
migration flows and levels of foreign remittances. Such disruptions in critical financial life-lines 
have disoriented co-religionists on both sides of the Mediterranean as Maghrebis surviving 
precariously in ghetto-like suburbs outside large, prosperous European cities mirror the situation 
of many of their Arab brothers and sisters living in the “homelands.”[4] 
Such conditions of political oppression, social marginalization, economic deprivation, and cultural 
alienation, whether perceived or real, have created a wide-ranging landscape of disaffected 
young people ever ready to engage in militant activity often catalyzed by religious invocation and 
Islamist appeal inspiring, among the most fanatical among them, a sense of martyrdom justifying 
the use of terror including suicide bombing.[5] 
Thus, there now exists a complex and intricate web of interrelated forces connecting autocratic 
political orders with anemic levels of socioeconomic development impacting most directly a broad 
swathe of alienated and angry youth at home and abroad who find salvation in the cathartic 
appeals of a puritanical Islam communicated in the militant language of the urban mosque and 
the charismatic imam.[6] 
To the extent that the West in general and the United States in particular are perceived as deeply 
implicated in the maintenance of this “unjust” system based on “oppression” and “exploitation,” 
they will be the natural targets for terrorists and terrorism. If this cycle of violence rooted in a 
complex interdependency is to be broken, it must begin with political change in the Maghreb itself.  
This Strategic Insight ’s principal finding sees no fundamental political change taking place in any 
of the three North African countries in the near or intermediate future.[7] Indeed, rather than 
“transitions to democracy” occurring as many have suggested and even more have hoped, a 
“robust authoritarianism” has been maintained. At the same time, however, a vibrant civil society 
is also emerging which potentially can serve as the natural challenge to the autocratic state and 
thereby facilitate the evolution of a political society within which democracy can be nurtured, 
liberal or otherwise.[8] Yet, to date, the state has succeeded in manipulating, co-opting, or 
coercing civil society’s most politically potent organizations—mass-based political parties both 
secular and Islamist.[9] 
Methodology 
The research for this paper derives from field interviews, meetings, and discussions while on 
lecture tours in Tunis, Tunisia (March 4-11, 2004) and Madrid, Spain (May 9-16, 2004) with a 
broad range of North African and European students, professors, media personnel, government 
officials, opposition figures, and Islamic activists. It is supplemented by journalistic, governmental, 
business, scholarly, and political risk assessment data gathered through primary and secondary 
sources in the United States, Europe, and North Africa. 
Despite the current preoccupation among academics and analysts with “democratic transition” in 
the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), no such transition has taken place anywhere in the 
region if only because the necessary precondition—the collapse of authoritarianism—has yet to 
take place.[10] Save for the fully democratic election of nonstate actor Mahmoud Abbas as 
president of the Palestinian Authority on January 9, 2005, no Arab leader has ever arrived to 
national-level power democratically. It is thus premature to assess either the conditions for 
democracy’s emergence or its eventual consolidation when political power remains firmly in the 
hands of the authoritarian state best represented by the tripartite pillars of control and coercion—
the military, the business technocracy, and the executive, whether presidential or monarchical. 
To be sure, the system’s harshest features have been softened through the establishment of so-
called “liberal autocracies,” “illiberal democracies,”[11] or “quasi-democracies” involving “guided 
pluralism, controlled elections, and selective repression”[12] as currently in evidence, for example, 
in Jordan, Morocco, Yemen, Kuwait, Algeria, and Egypt. Yet, in the final analysis, and despite a 
multitude of separate and overlapping domestic pressures and external incentives for substantive 
democratic change, power remains as it always has—in the hands of the unaccountable few 
governing over the unrepresented many. 
The Authoritarian Impulse 
Michael Hudson’s prescient observation about Arab politics made nearly thirty years ago is still 
fully applicable: “The central problem of government in the Arab world today is political legitimacy. 
The shortage of this indispensable political resource largely accounts for the volatile nature of 
Arab politics and the autocratic…character of all present governments.”[13] 
Numerous scholars have sought to explain this legitimacy deficit and the concurrent durability of 
authoritarianism in the Arab world by identifying a number of overlapping causal and contributing 
factors. These conditions revolve around several broad categories of interpretation—economic 
explanations,[14] cultural causes,[15] political determinants,[16] patterns of societal-state 
formation,[17] the role of religion,[18] and gender-based factors.[19] Despite the current appeal of 
culturally-based explanations for the authoritarian impulse, most analysts privilege more complex 
dynamics “involving economic growth and stagnation, social-structural transformation, state 
formation and institutional inertia, and ideological transformation.”[20] 
The strength, coherence, and effectiveness of the state’s coercive apparatus serve to highlight 
the “robustness” of authoritarianism. It is this robustness that provides the most useful framework 
of analysis in attempting to explain North Africa’s enduring authoritarianism. What are the broader 
comparative and theoretical assumptions about state capabilities, and will that help explain the 
sustainability of the security establishment (mukhabarat) in the face of internal challenges and 
external pressures? 
Focusing on the enabling capabilities of the national security state, Eva Bellin identifies the 
following determinative conditions: the status of a country’s fiscal health including access to 
rentier income in the form of oil and gas resources, geostrategic utility, and control of crucial 
transit facilities; the level and kind of international support networks; the degree of 
institutionalization of the military and whether it operates according to legal-rational criteria or 
patrimonial ones; the existence of popular political mobilization; and the use of perceived or real 
threats to state security.[21] 
These do not encompass the full universe of possible reasons why North African authoritarianism 
remains so robust but it does identify critical structural factors that transcend issues of culture, 
history, personality, or religion that have often been invoked by analysts trying to explain MENA’s 
non-democratic “exceptionalism.”[22] One researcher has usefully summarized this overall 
pattern by stating that “a set of interdependent institutional, economic, ideological, social, and 
geostrategic factors has created an adaptable ecology of repression, control, and partial 
openness. The weblike quality of this political ecosystem both helps partial autocracies to survive 
and makes their rulers unwilling to give up final control over any strand of the whole.”[23] 
Each of the variables identified above applies to the Maghreb. 
Fiscal Health  
It has been shown from experiences in Africa and elsewhere that there is a direct link between 
the state’s coercive capabilities and the maintenance of fiscal health. The mukhabarat cannot 
long endure if it lacks the financial resources to pay its soldiers, purchase arms, upgrade 
equipment, maintain supplies, and acquire externally-gathered intelligence data. When presumed 
to be strong states began to collapse in Africa, for example, as Bellin reminds us, it was because 
prolonged fiscal crisis had “hollowed out” the coercive apparatus of the state.[24] 
In North Africa, while economies underperform and human and material resources are 
underutilized, the overall fiscal health of Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia is sufficiently robust to 
sustain more than adequate expenditures on security apparatuses. In fact, the Maghreb ranks 
noticeably above average in the proportion of GNP spent on security approaching five percent in 
2000 as compared to the global average of 3.8 percent. 
Rentier income derived from such critical resources as oil and gas enable strong states to sustain 
elaborate coercive structures even if a country’s overall economic health is poor as the case of 
Algeria so clearly demonstrates. While Morocco and Tunisia may lack these valuable resources 
in large enough quantities to make a financial difference, other strategic rents such as foreign aid, 
tourism revenues, remittances from abroad, and so forth serve the same function of insuring that 
the state will pay itself first including covering the costs of maintaining bloated military and 
security forces.[25]  
It should be noted that “strong” states are being defined in a narrow coercive sense not as 
possessing enduring political legitimacy. Indeed, Ayubi’s distinction between a “strong” state and 
a “fierce” state applies directly to the North African situation. As with the rest of the Arab world, 
the Maghreb state “is not a natural growth of its own socio-economic history or its own cultural 
and intellectual tradition.”[26] Instead, the North African state can better be understood as “fierce” 
since, in order to preserve itself, it resorts to the use of raw power as its default function. It is not 
“strong” because the Maghreb state “lacks the infrastructural power that enables [it] to penetrate 
society effectively through mechanisms such as taxation. [It also] lacks ideological hegemony (in 
a Gramscian sense) that would enable it to forge a historic social bloc that accepts the legitimacy 
of the ruling stratum.”[27] 
The state’s “fierce” attributes are reinforced by its rentier status that enables the country’s fiscal 
health to remain disconnected from society’s productive economic forces yet directly tied to the 
international political economy with its critical hydrocarbon lifeline. The connection between 
abundant oil rents and the aggrandizement of the authoritarian state, at the expense of an 
autonomous civil society, cannot be overemphasized. Sadiki summarizes this relationship 
accurately when he writes: 
[T]he huge returns from external oil rent have contributed primarily to aggrandizement of the 
state…This aggrandizement applies to both oil producers and non-producers. The former directly 
accrue billions of petrodollars from external oil rent. The latter….profit from the Arab oil 
boom….This latter group has become partly rentier economies. They rent labor, skills, and 
expertise to the scarcely populated Arab oil-producing states and thereby earn billions of dollars 
in remittances. Transfers of millions of Arab petrodollars either in the form of aid or investment 
are another factor in the equation. Petrodollars have endowed the Arab state with an independent 
resource to cement and reproduce itself.[28] 
International Support 
More than any other world region, the MENA’s sustained authoritarianism has been shaped by 
the successful maintenance of international support networks. While the Middle East portion of 
MENA has exploited these networks more extensively than the Maghreb, the latter has bec ome a 
critical staging area in the fight against Islamic terrorism. Representative examples of terrorist 
activities occurring in or originating from the region include the prolonged bloodletting taking place 
in Algeria since 1992,[29] the terrorist bombing in Djerba in April 2002, the Casablanca suicide 
attacks in May 2003, the deadly explosions in Madrid in March 2004, and the murder of 
controversial Dutch filmmaker Theo van Gogh on November 2, 2004, in Amsterdam by a 
Moroccan militant with ties to al-Qaeda. The war against global terrorism has significantly raised 
the Maghreb’s geopolitical profile especially in American eyes. In so doing, fighting terrorism has 
joined access to reliable oil and gas supplies as two key concerns justifying intense foreign 
involvement with existing army-backed regimes in Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia. 
A series of recent military and security actions provide more evidence that the “footprint” of United 
States armed forces is spreading steadily through the Maghreb and the neighboring Sahel region. 
Its most public expression is the administration’s Pan Sahel Initiative (PSI), originally conceived 
by State Department planners in 2002 as a means of beefing up Sahelian armed forces against 
the terrorist threat, but finally implemented in mid-January 2004 as a means of cracking down on 
al-Qaeda's penetration of countries like Mali and Niger, but also Algeria and Mauritania via 
groups like the GSPC (Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat).[30] 
Working to prevent the Sahel from becoming “another Afghanistan” where Islamic militants train 
and prepare for terrorist operations worldwide, the PSI and Washington’s new interest in regions 
like southern Algeria fits into a global geostrategic vision that dovetails with Algeria’s own 
domestic political agenda including maintaining a robust authoritarian state. While unconfirmed, 
there are reports that U.S. special forces have been sent to the Algerian Sahara to work along 
with regional forces in combating al-Qaida.[31] Unusually for an operation that brought 
superpower forces to their borders, the Algerians did not seem overly concerned. This response 
has much to do with the courting by President Abdelaziz Bouteflika, newly-reelected in April 2004, 
of the United States as an ally in the war on terror, the Algerian authorities’ openness to creating 
new alliances after a decade of effective isolation due to the conflict with radical Islam, and the 
Algerian security forces’ need for help to be effective against mobile armed gangs in the vast 
Saharan deep south.[32] 
Related to the above has been a dramatic increase in funding for United States-based training of 
Algerian military officers under the IMET (International Military Education and Training) program 
with almost $600,000 provided for such training in 2003 as compared to only $30,000 in 2002. 
While these policies are intended to gain greater security for U.S. global interests, they also have 
the counterproductive result of making the mukhabarat  state more robust and thus less inclined to 
accede to societal demands for greater democracy.[33] 
To a lesser extent, the same kind of U.S. and international support has been accorded both 
Morocco and Tunisia. In 2003, for example, the United States decided to give Morocco $60 
million to assist in the fight against terrorism as well as for development programs. On June 3, 
2004, the United States granted Morocco the status of “major non-NATO ally” and, on June 15, 
2004, signed a free-trade agreement with the Kingdom. 
Among the unintended consequences of increased U.S. and other international military, political, 
and economic assistance to all three Maghrebi countries has been a clamp down on press 
freedoms, increased violations of human rights through random arrests of hundreds if not 
thousands of so-called Islamic terrorists in Morocco, and a general deterioration of political and 
civil rights.[34] It is within such a degraded political environment that terrorism finds its most 
willing recruits. 
As Bellin has pointed out, in Eastern Europe, Latin America, and parts of Africa, the withdrawal of 
international backing for authoritarian states “triggered both an existential and financial crisis for 
the regimes that often devastated both their will and capacity to carry on.”[35] Not only are such 
international withdrawals highly unlikely in the Maghreb but, as reported above, the region enjoys 
a unique position in the international arena that, given the importance of access to hydrocarbons 
and meeting the continuing challenge of Islamic terrorism, seems destined to be maintained into 
the indefinite future. 
Patrimonialism 
The Maghreb security apparatuses are shot through with patrimonial influences seriously 
compromising their rational-legal, professional, and institutionalized pretensions.[36] While 
Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia possess “professional” security forces, they are organized along 
patrimonial lines in which staffing decisions are ruled by cronyism, the distinction between public 
and private mission is blurred, leading to flagrant corruption and abuse of power, and discipline is 
maintained through exploitation of primordial cleavage. In all three countries patrimonial linkages 
between the regime and the security apparatus are so deeply enmeshed that, in reference to 
Algeria, it has been said that “every state has an army but in Algeria the army has a state.”[37] 
Simply put, the conflation between authoritarian civilian regimes and the military enhances the 
state’s robustness which is further deepened by the patrimonial logic that is so endemic in the 
Maghreb. 
The terrorist challenge confronting the region has worked to enhance state security resources 
through increased domestic expenditures for the military and expanded foreign arms assistance. 
Rather than forcing a further professionalization or institutionalization of the security apparatus, 
however, such increases have deepened patrimonial privileges to the advantage of state 
authority and at the expense of civil society. 
In all three Maghrebi countries the mukhabarat constitutes the state’s most advantaged institution 
serving as the bastion of elite privilege and guardian of regime interests. Even Tunisia’s security 
apparatus, once modest by Arab world standards, has ballooned under President Ben Ali, himself 
a military man.[38] The decade-long civil war in Algeria and Morocco’s thirty-year struggle in the 
Western Sahara have further empowered the armed forces of both states. 
It seems unlikely that the authoritarian state will soon wither away or voluntarily relinquish power 
as long as the security apparatus, the linchpin of state survival, is shot through with 
patrimonialism in which personalism pervades staffing decisions, political reliability supersedes 
merit in promotions, intercorps and intracorps discipline is maintained by relying on balanced 
rivalry between primordial groups, the distinction between public and private is not scrupulously 
observed, and the military continues to serve as a major path to personal enrichment.[39] 
Popular Mobilization 
In other situations and in different world regions, the authoritarian state’s ability to maintain itself 
in power has been shaped by the degree to which it faces a high level of popular mobilization. 
Violently repressing or killing thousands of people in order to maintain authority carries huge 
political costs for the regime and is thus not used lightly or regularly. What is astonishing, but 
common, in the Maghreb is how infrequent and limited such popular mobilization has taken place 
in the modern period. Either society remains eerily passive, as in present day Tunisia, or it erupts 
into civil war, as in Algeria. 
This is not to suggest that North Africa has not experienced or continues to experience sporadic 
social unrest, labor strikes, student demonstrations, or even anarchic outbursts as in the Berber 
uprising of 1980 and the October riots of 1988 in Algeria. Yet such public expressions of social 
discontent are rarely rooted in organized political movements reflecting ideological coherence and 
political purpose that would serve serious notice to state incumbents that the peoples’ wants and 
demands are to be taken seriously.[40] Nowhere in North Africa and indeed throughout the Arab 
world, for example, “do mammoth, cross-class coalitions mobilize on the streets to push for 
reform” thus making the costs of repression relatively low for the regime.[41] 
Only among Islamists have popular forces been capable of being mobilized in large numbers 
sufficient enough to force incumbent regimes to think seriously about political reform including the 
possibility of legitimizing a democratic transition.[42] Yet, in every instance where political Islam 
has posed such a challenge in the Arab world, as in the cases of Jordan, Yemen, Algeria, Egypt, 
Tunisia, Syria, and Morocco for example, the state has ultimately decided either to violently 
suppress such movements (Algeria, Egypt, Syria) or apply a combination of harsh legal 
constraints and political co-optation to delimit the movement’s influence as in Jordan and Yemen 
(Tunisia has utilized both force and legal constraints). Where coercive measures have been 
applied, all three countries of North Africa have found external support, either directly or indirectly, 
for their actions. France and the United States, for example, were virtually silent when the army 
staged a coup d’état against an impending Islamist parliamentary victory in Algeria in January 
1992.[43] 
As long as civil societies exhibit a variety of socio-economic and cultural cleavages and remain 
seriously divided along religious-secular, urban-rural, male-female, modern-traditional, literate-
illiterate, and indigenous-global lines, it will be difficult for high levels of popular mobilization to 
develop thus facilitating the state’s ability to repress political reform and choose coercion over 
compromise when such challenges do emerge. It seems highly unlikely, for example, that what 
successfully transpired in Iran under the Islamic revolution will be duplicated anytime soon in the 
Maghreb. Indeed, the Iranian experience has served as an object lesson of what incumbent 
regimes need to do to insure that neither revolution nor democracy erupts in the Arab world. 
The Question of Palestine 
Probably no single issue has so mobilized state and society in the Arab world as the question of 
Palestine. The conflict between Israel and Palestine touches virtually every emotional and 
political chord among Arabs serving as the touchstone of Arab identity, integrity, and importance. 
To be sure the military threat posed by Israel can serve as additional fodder for regimes seeking 
to further empower the security apparatus. Yet, as one researcher has accurately observed, “the 
arc of authoritarianism in the [MENA] region far exceeds the fly-zone of the Israeli air force; that is, 
countries far removed from the epicenter of the [Palestinian-Israeli] conflict still share the region’s 
propensity for robust coercive apparatuses.”[44] 
Thus, the Palestinian issue in the Maghreb is less about enhancing security to protect against 
“Zionist aggression” as it is about further advantaging the state in its ability to stand up to the 
ideological, political, global as well as military challenge that Israel represents to the Arab world. 
The continuous suffering taking place in Palestine as communicated daily on national and 
satellite television serves to antagonize and anger vast majorities of Maghrebi peoples. Yet, 
rather than being transformed into an effective agent of popular mobilization against authoritarian 
rule, such anger is co-opted by incumbent regimes to further justify robust state power. 
Like Islamism, the question of Palestine has been effectively integrated into the political language 
of the state as a way to disarm and delegitimize potential opponents. This tactic of ideological 
cooptation of key symbols of popular mobilization such as Islamism and Palestine have undercut 
the ability of autonomous groups to develop a truly democratic if not liberal Islam while making 
compromise on the Palestinian issue more difficult to achieve. As one observer has correctly 
pointed out, “the greatest obstacle to democracy is posed not by Islam but by military and 
intelligence organizations unaccountable to democratic authority.”[45] The result is a robust 
authoritarian state secure in the knowledge that neither domestic, regional, nor international 
forces can fundamentally alter its autocratic practices which, in any case, have increasingly been 
re-packaged as experiments in “democracy,” “liberalism,” and “reform.” 
State-Society Dynamics 
Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia confront serious political, security, and socioeconomic challenges 
that only political reform and institutionalized democracy can help solve. Yet, in all three cases, 
robust authoritarianism rather than effective reform dominates regime policies. As reported above, 
several interrelated variables help explain this condition of enhanced state authority in the face of 
challenges from an increasingly animated civil society. Yet one wonders how long such inherently 
conflictual conditions can obtain without causing further problems some leading to the kind of 
extremist politics currently evident both within and outside the region. 
This article has argued that terrorism is one outcome of the failure to fundamentally reform and 
restructure Maghrebi political orders. It is no accident that despite widely varied socioeconomic 
conditions all three countries remain politically autocratic. Tunisia, for example, represents an 
exceptional case of a very successful albeit incomplete economic and social transformation. 
Tunisia 
Since my last visit to the country in 1993, for example, significant progress has been made in the 
country’s overall development. Tunisia today is a fully modern country with impressive 
quantitative and qualitative indicators supporting such a conclusion. I was particularly impressed 
by the level of political awareness and consciousness among society’s educated classes and 
their ability and willingness to talk openly about sensitive political issues albeit in private 
gatherings yet in public places. 
Given this high level of socioeconomic development, cultural consciousness, and political 
sophistication it was that much more striking to observe the continued maintenance of a security 
state with all the trappings of police surveillance and intimidation.[46] The widening gap between 
society’s material prosperity—nearly seventy-five percent of Tunisians own their own home—and 
its political primitiveness is reaching crisis proportions. Despite its draconian security measures, 
for example, the regime was unable to stop terrorists from attacking a Djerba synagogue in April 
2002 nor prevent scores, maybe even hundreds, of Tunisian nationals living in Europe and 
elsewhere from participating in terrorist activities including involvement in the train bombings in 
Spain in March 2004.[47] 
The pattern of state-led oppression has been maintained through a fused system of social 
liberalization on the one hand and political subjugation on the other. Yet this framework of control 
and coercion is operationalized through a democratic façade intended to convey a sense that 
democracy is alive and well in Tunisia. The most recent such exercise in political manipulation 
took place with the October 2004 presidential and legislative elections. 
Electoral Engineering 
To the surprise of no one, on October 24, 2004, Tunisians turned out in record numbers—91.5 
percent of the country's 4.6 million eligible voters—to re-elect President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali to 
a fourth consecutive five-year term. Voters also gave his ruling party, the Constitutional 
Democratic Rally (RCD-Rassemblement Constitutionnel Démocratique), an overwhelming victory 
in parliamentary elections held on the same day. 
The election results were never in doubt once Ben Ali had pushed through a constitutional 
amendment, approved in a landslide referendum in May 2002, that eliminated the three-term limit 
for presidents. Intentionally or not, Ben Ali seems to be following in the footsteps of his 
predecessor, Habib Bourguiba, whom he overthrew in a "constitutional coup" on November 7, 
1987, partially in response to Bourguiba's self-designation as "president for life." 
The early optimism that the post-Bourguiba era would see the arrival of political pluralism if not 
democracy has been all but extinguished in the last fifteen years as the president and his ruling 
party have come to dominate the political scene while eradicating all sources of opposition, 
secular or religious. To be sure, the regime has been enormously successful in pursuing 
progressive social policies as regards women's rights and in advancing economic development--
the country's gross national product (GNP) per capita tops $3,500. But this success has simply 
added to the discontinuity that defines the Tunisian paradox in which enhanced material well-
being coexists alongside a robust political authoritarianism. 
In part to offset a negative political profile among actual and potential foreign allies and investors, 
the regime has contrived a carefully crafted but thoroughly transparent pseudo-democracy 
predicated on a tightly controlled political pluralism and predetermined electoral outcomes. The 
October 2004 elections are the most recent manifestation of this political ploy. 
Determined to solidify his "democratic" credentials among his own people and his supporters in 
Europe and the United States, Ben Ali permitted three non-threatening candidates to contest his 
re-election, as compared to two competitors in 1999 and none in 1994 and 1989. Of these 
challengers, only Mohamed Ali Halouani, head of the Ettajdid Party (ex-Communist) and 
representing a bloc of independent politicians under the "Democratic Initiative" label, publicly 
decried the results after obtaining just 0.95 percent of the vote. Mohamed Bouchiha, secretary-
general of the Popular Unity Party (PUP-Parti de l'Unité Populaire), who also happens to be 
related to Ben Ali's wife, received 3.78 percent while Mounir Béji of the Liberal Social Party (PSL-
Parti Social Libéral) obtained 0.79 percent. 
None of these government-approved candidates has a significant political following nor does any 
challenge the President's personality or policies. In the view of regime supporters, Ben Ali's 
"modest" 94.48 percent victory, down from his previous highs of 99.7 percent, 99.6 percent, and 
99.4 percent in 1989, 1994, and 1999 respectively, highlights the "contested" nature of the 
presidential election. 
The outcome of the parliamentary election paralleled that of the presidency. While not 
constitutionally mandated, four-fifths of the legislature's seats are effectively reserved for the 
ruling party while the remaining twenty percent are contested by the country's seven officially 
sanctioned opposition parties. Thus, of the total 189 seats in the unicameral parliament, the RCD 
won 152, and the remaining 37 seats were distributed among the Social Democratic Movement 
(MDS-Mouvement des Démocrates Socialists), the PUP, the Union of Democratic Unionist (UDU-
Union Démocratique Unioniste), Ettajdid, and PSL. 
The ruling party is especially proud of its commitment to make at least twenty-five percent of its 
candidates women. RCD women won thirty-nine seats, compared to twenty in the previous 
parliament. Overall, forty-three of the 189 newly-elected deputies are women, one of the highest 
levels in the world. Unfortunately for both men and women legislators, however, the Chamber of 
Deputies plays a marginal political role and its influence over national policy is virtually nil. 
None of the opposition parties represented in parliament challenge the regime's hegemony or the 
absolute power of the presidency. The "real" opposition is banned, imprisoned, or harassed. It 
includes the still-popular Islamist party, An Nahda, headed by Rachid Ghannouchi, who lives in 
self-imposed exile in London. Modernist and secular figures representing a broad spectrum of 
political tendencies from liberal democrats (Moncef Marzouki) to communists (Hamma Hammami) 
to progressive socialists (Nejib Chebbi) have all decried the blatantly manipulative character of 
the political process. Outspoken journalists, human rights activists, academics, lawyers, and other 
public personalities have joined them in condemning the oppressive nature of political life where 
the media is tightly controlled, the Internet monitored, and freedom of political expression all but 
banned. Marzouki's description of Ben Ali's three-pronged policy accurately reflects the way this 
leader is perceived by these and other democratically inclined groups: "To remain indefinitely in 
power, to remain indefinitely in power, to remain indefinitely in power."[48]  
Morocco 
Morocco faces greater and potentially more lethal challenges as its socioeconomic performance 
remains modest at best and its political opening tepid and uneven. The Casablanca attacks of 
May 16, 2003, exposed the country’s vulnerabilities and the degree to which Moroccan nationals 
have been deeply implicated in a global network of loosely interrelated terrorist groups. My 
meetings in Spain with European and Moroccan respondents, for example, revealed the intensity 
of commitment to “militant Islam” as compared to the monarchy’s attempt to project a “moderate 
Islam.” 
Much of Morocco’s militancy has been self-induced. A radical interpretation of Islamic belief has 
become increasingly appealing to those frustrated by the failure of secular policies to deal with 
poverty, inequality and corruption, and radical groups ready to use violence and terrorism have 
emerged. In addition, Wahabism has been propagated by preachers from Saudi Arabia and has 
won adherents, particularly among the marginalized classes of the urban areas. Wahabi clerics 
were allowed to carry on their work because Saudi Arabia has been an important source of 
investment and financial aid for Morocco, and the Moroccan and Saudi royal families have long 
had close ties. 
Prior to the Casablanca suicide bombings, the authorities had arrested members of radical 
Islamist groups active in the poorer neighborhoods of major Moroccan cities that had used 
violence to enforce their vision of Islam. They also began to shut down unauthorized mosques, 
and ban bookshops and itinerant booksellers peddling radical and inflammatory Islamist texts and 
prerecorded tapes. However, these measures did not prevent the 2003 suicide attacks, and, 
indeed, may even have helped to provoke them. 
The current wave of Islamic militancy in Morocco has spread across the globe with evidence that 
Moroccan radicals, some with military training in Afghanistan, are deeply involved in terrorist 
activities. Moroccans have been implicated in terrorist networks involved in the September 11, 
2001, attacks in the United States, the attacks in Jiddah, Saudi Arabia in May 2003, and, most 
recently, the suicide bombings in Spain in 2004. According to intelligence reports, the Madrid 
bombers belonged to the Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group (GICM, Groupe islamiste 
combattant marocain), formed in Afghanistan with links to Salafia Jihadia (Salafiyya Jihadiyya, or 
Jihad for Pure Islam), a Moroccan extremist Islamist movement accused by Rabat of carrying out 
the Casablanca suicide bombings. One of those arrested in Spain is Jamal Zougam, who is 
reported to have links with both Mohamed Fizazi, the founder of Salafia al-Jihadia currently in jail 
serving a thirty-year sentence, and Amer Azizi, a Moroccan charged in 2003 with belonging to an 
al-Qaida cell that helped to plan the September 11th attacks.[49] 
Evidence provided by investigatory journalists, intelligence services, and government officials in 
Morocco and Spain provides a chilling portrait of how frustrated, discontented, and deeply angry 
Moroccan youth living in poor quarters of big cities especially in the north have been recruited to 
militant activities, with some receiving training in Afghanistan, and then transformed into human 
explosives prepared to commit suicide in the name of some primordial interpretation of Islam that 
guarantees instant salvation through martyrdom. Many of these Islamists returning from 
Afghanistan have also found recruits among wealthier Moroccans who span two worlds but, 
frustrated by their secondary status in Europe, discovered in political Islam a purpose. 
“My brothers were not like this when they left Morocco,” said Jamal Benyaich, scion of a rich 
Tangier family whose eldest brother, Abdelaziz, has emerged as a central figure in the Moroccan 
militant network. Jamal’s other brothers, Salaheddin and Abdullah, both became Islamic fighter, 
too. “They became Islamists in Europe,” he said. “All of them lived a very European life in 
Morocco but came back with a new personality.”[50] 
This is not to suggest that the European experience has been determinative in transforming beurs  
into jihadists.[51] But one insiders account of his Algerian “assassin brothers” does present a 
complex interaction of diverse experiences involving the workings of a jihadist cell, the 
radicalizing effects of exile from the Algerian civil war, and the challenges for a Western 
democracy (France) of assimilating Muslim immigrants.[52] Although focusing specifically on 
Algerian militants in France, the making of a jihadist terrorist described by Sifaoui applies broadly 
across the Maghreb. 
The depth of terrorist activity involving Moroccans both in Europe and in Morocco itself was 
highlighted in a July 25, 2004, article in El Pais, Spain’s largest and most widely read newspaper, 
which reported the results of a government investigation into the Madrid bombings. According to 
Spanish investigators, Moroccan authorities had informed Madrid that it had lost track of 400 of 
the 600 Moroccans known to have trained in terrorist camps run by al-Qaida in Afghanistan. The 
article also reported that Morocco had told Spanish officials that it had more than 2,000 Islamic 
militants within its borders. Of the roughly sixty men suspected to be connected to the March 11, 
2004, train bombings in Madrid, forty are from Morocco, the article said. According to the Spanish 
judge heading the investigation into al-Qaeda’s presence in Spain, “the most serious problem that 
Europe has right now with this type of terrorism is in Morocco.”[53] 
In a separate but related terrorist investigation, Spanish authorities in October 2004 charged and 
jailed thirty-three Moroccans and Algerians involved in an alleged plot to slam a truck carrying 
1,100 pounds of explosives into Madrid’s National Court which is overseeing Spain’s anti-terror 
investigation related to the Madrid bombings of March 2004.[54] 
The ideological and operational fusion of in-country and overseas Moroccan militants have raised 
the stakes for the government whose survivalist strategy has led it to further limit rather than 
expand political and civil rights. Since the passage of a tough new anti-terrorism law that was 
rushed through the parliament in 2003 following the Casablanca bombings, thousands of 
terrorism suspects have been arrested. Numerous trials of arrested Islamic radicals have taken 
place with hash sentences meted out to many. The result has been a return to some of the 
regime’s worst authoritarian excesses as practiced under Hassan II including flagrant abuses of 
human rights, including arbitrary arrest, torture, and unfair trials.[55] 
The monarch’s July 2004 decision to build twenty new mosques throughout the country to 
operate under tight government supervision as a way by which to counter the plethora of 
unofficial mosques in which self-appointed imams preach radical Islamic precepts reflects the 
regime’s basic incomprehension of the nature of the challenge which it faces which remains, at 
bottom, fundamentally political. 
Algeria 
In Algeria political liberalization in the form of relatively free albeit controlled presidential elections 
seems to be taking hold without necessarily, however, compromising the state’s ultimate 
command and control of polity and economy.[56] President Bouteflika’s resounding electoral 
victory on April 8, 2004, when he secured eighty-five percent of the registered vote, provides the 
Algerian leader with another five years to try to overcome the country’s dismal socioeconomic 
conditions.[57] As discussed earlier, a country’s fiscal health works to enhance the position and 
power of the security apparatus. With oil prices approaching the fifty dollars per barrel range in 
mid-2004, Algeria’s macro economic profile has improved. This has done little, however, to 
ameliorate the country’s micro economic condition which still finds ordinary Algerians struggling 
with the basic necessities of life. 
In the absence of a thorough and unambiguous democratic transformation of political life and not 
withstanding the reported forced resignation in July 2004 of General Mohammed Lamari, the 
army’s most influential figure,[58] most Algerians still believe that Bouteflika’s election serves 
merely to consolidate the power of the shadowy military elite that has held sway in one form or 
another since independence in 1962. In the Algerian press, robust and independent-minded by 
Arab standards.[59] commentators have drawn parallels between Bouteflika and the Tunisian 
president, Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali, accusing him of seeking to emulate the centralization of power 
achieved by his autocratic neighbor who, as discussed above, successfully amended the 
constitution so that he could run for a fourth term in October 2004 following his 99+ percent 
victories in 1989, 1994, and 1999.[60] 
While daily violence has declined and terrorist attacks reduced including the killing and capture of 
leading GSPC figures,[61] the Algerian government’s human rights record as reported by 
numerous human rights monitoring organizations remains poor to very bad. Arbitrary arrests, 
prolonged incommunicado detentions, excessive use of force, extrajudicial killings, reported 
cases of torture, and official impunity have all been identified as routine practices of the regime. 
Similarly, deprivations of basic human and civil rights have taken place in the areas of speech, 
assembly, and political activity. Even Al-Jazeera’s Algiers bureau was forced to close following 
critical reports of the country’s security laws that have led to increases in short-term 
disappearances of prisoners deemed “threats to national security.” 
To be sure, until the armed insurgency and its expanding links to al-Qaida’s jihad are completely 
squelched, the Algerian “crisis” will continue. Yet more decisively will be the need to resolve the 
system’s fundamental constitutional questions—“the armed forces’ political role, presidential 
prerogatives, judicial independence, and, more generally, the problem of establishing law-bound 
government.”[62] 
The Democratic Imperative 
North Africa’s authoritarian impulse has sabotaged, at great human cost, all efforts to advance 
the region’s developmental goals. Rentier-based economies have empowered “the mukhabarat  
state with its military and police apparatuses. It continues to be able to reproduce itself and 
perfect its coercive capacity.”[63] Only a successful transition to a democratic system of rule 
involving, at minimum, application of Dahl’s dual polyarchical requirements of public contestation 
and the right to participate[64] can overcome the current condition of political stasis, economic 
stagnation, social atrophy, and cultural discontinuity. 
Yet the one social class capable of animating civil society in its challenge to the authoritarian 
state remains remarkably indifferent if not hostile to pluralistic politics. Moore’s dictum of “no 
bourgeoisie, no democracy”[65] seems not to have taken hold in the Maghreb where the 
professional middle class functions, at best, as “contingent democrats”[66] or “reluctant 
democrats.”[67] The potentially powerful and influential business communities in each of the three 
countries seem to want “money even more than they want political participation. If they can find 
nondemocratic ways to protect economic interests, they can live with that. [In the final analysis,] 
businessmen, interested primarily in profit, are more concerned with a regime’s effectiveness 
than with its openness: they want a state weak enough to loot but strong enough to be worth 
looting.”[ 68] 
The only social movements in Maghrebi countries insistent on democratic change, government 
accountability, the rule of law, transparency, and civilian authority are non-violent Islamist political 
parties. Rooted in civil society and representing mass-based interests, Islamists challenge state 
power directly both at the level of rhetoric and action. Since government accountability and the 
rule of law are central to the democratic project, Islamists are best positioned to promote 
substantive change. Yet no Arab regime in North Africa or the Middle East has ever permitted an 
Islamist movement to come to power through peaceful, democratic means save for a brief 
moment at the legislative level in Algeria from 1989 to early 1992. 
The democratic imperative in North Africa needs no Islamic qualifier but Islamists are the most 
committed to the democratic project. As long as all actors play according to the democratic rules 
of the game, then none should be excluded from participation. How else can political differences 
be resolved peacefully? Stepan makes this point clear:  
Democracy is a system of conflict regulation that allows open competition over the values and 
goals that citizens want to advance. [A]s long as groups do not use violence, do not violate the 
rights of other citizens, and stay within the rules of the democratic game, all groups [including 
Islamists] are granted the right to advance their interests, both in civil society and in political 
society. This is the minimal institutional statement of what democratic politics does and does not 
entail.[69] 
An institutional or procedural approach to democracy implies “that no group in civil society—
including religious groups—can a priori be prohibited from forming a political party. Constraints on 
political parties may only be imposed after a party, by its actions, violates democratic 
principles.”[70] The “twin tolerations”—freedom for democratically elected governments and 
freedom for religious organizations in civil and political society—serve as the minimal definition of 
democracy.[71] 
Radical politics seem the inevitable alternative both domestically and internationally when these 
“twin tolerations” are absent or systematically compromised by autocratic ruling elites. While 
theories of economic deprivation and psychological alienation play a role in explaining the 
radicalization of Islamic politics in North Africa and beyond, in its essence Muslims rebel in 
response to political oppression. This thesis is most forcefully and, I believe, most convincingly 
presented by Hafez when he writes:  
Muslims become violently militant when they encounter exclusionary states that deny them 
meaningful access to political institutions and employ indiscriminate repressive policies against 
their citizens during periods of mass mobilization. Political exclusion and state repression unleash 
a dynamic of radicalization characterized by exclusive rebel organizations that isolate Islamists 
from their broader society and foster antisystem ideologies that frame the potentially healthy 
competition between secularism and Islamism as a mortal struggle between faith and impiety.[72] 
Given the determinate role of the United States as a critical outside actor, can it provide support 
for the “twin tolerations” as a way of promoting institutionalized democracy and thereby reduce 
the impact of global terrorism? 
The Role of the United States 
In the face of continued state intransigence in the Maghreb, it seems unlikely that civil society, 
however animated and robust, can produce the necessary conditions for the establishment of a 
political society within which independent political parties can emerge serving as the institutional 
spearhead of a democratic transition. The international support variable has demonstrated the 
importance of external actors in shaping the style and direction of state behavior. In this regard, 
current U.S. objectives to bring democracy to the Arab world through the Broader Middle East 
Initiative is laudatory and logical. The Initiative’s underlying assumptions regarding the need to 
break the link between political authoritarianism, socioeconomic deprivation, cultural alienation, 
and terrorism by creating a democratic alternative are compelling and convincing. 
Unfortunately, the situations in Iraq, Israel-Palestine, and Saudi Arabia, among others, have 
seriously undermined the credibility of such efforts in the minds of many Arabs.[73] More harmful 
has been the way in which North African leaders, with Ben Ali serving as prime example, have 
usurped the symbolism, rhetoric, and outward manifestations of democratic practices to serve 
authoritarian ends. As one analyst has correctly observed: “Insofar as survival strategies have 
increased the perceived costs of democratization while not providing for effective economic 
development, [even liberal autocrats] have shown themselves unwilling or unable to cross 
anxious hard-liners in the military, the security forces, and the business community.”[74] 
For its part the United States simply cannot stand by and allow its democratic efforts to fail if only 
because terrorism is so deeply embedded into the authoritarian impulse that can only be 
overcome through the democratic imperative. Given the region’s paucity of will and robust 
authoritarianism, there is not likely to be any substantive political changes in the Maghreb until 
the United States presses leaders like Ben Ali, Bouteflika, and Mohamed VI, all of whom have 
close personal and political ties to the current administration, “to transcend an involuted 
gradualism whose small steps trace the sad contours of an unvirtuous circle [of conflict, stalemate, 
reform, and conflict] rather than the hopeful lineaments of a real path forward.”[75] 
As Brumberg has correctly pointed out, if a policy of substantive democratic change is to succeed, 
the United States must insist on the creation of effective and independent political parties, the 
institutionalization of truly representative legislative bodies, and the firm application of the rule of 
law. All this must also “be accompanied by vigorous international support for effective monitoring 
of local and national elections.”[76] 
In the absence of such efforts there is no reason to believe that the Maghreb’s robust 
authoritarianism will dissolve anytime soon. Sadly, therefore, the conclusion of someone who is 
otherwise a severe critic of America’s efforts to promote democracy in North Africa and the 
Middle East, will continue to be true. “The entire Arab world is blighted by a group of remarkably 
similar regimes that share several characteristics in common, notably their stagnant political 
systems and the ubiquitous, brutal efficiency of the means of repression that keep their respective 
oligarchies safely in power to siphon off and profit from their societies’ surplus.”[77] 
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